Patent rights, innovation, and ﬁrm exit by Galasso, Alberto & Schankerman, Mark
  
Alberto Galasso and Mark Schankerman 
Patent rights, innovation, and firm exit 
 






Galasso, Alberto and Schankerman, Mark (2018) Patent rights, innovation, and firm exit. RAND 
Journal of Economics, 49 (1). pp. 64-86. ISSN 0741-6261 
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12219 
 
© 2018 The RAND Corporation 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88081/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: June 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 




Patent Rights, Innovation and Firm Exit1
Alberto Galasso
University of Toronto and NBER
Mark Schankerman
London School of Economics and CEPR
August 3, 2017
1We are grateful to the Editor, Chad Syverson, and two anonymous referees and for very constructive
suggestions that greatly improved the paper. We also thank Philippe Aghion, Iain Cockburn, Petra
Moser, Florian Schuett, Carlos Serrano, Mariagrazia Squicciarini, Heidi Williams and participants in
seminars at Bocconi University, Cattolica University, CEPR Conference on Applied IO, Duke, Einaudi
Institute in Rome, IESE Barcelona, Tel Aviv University, UC Berkeley, University of Toronto, ZEW
Mannheim, NBER and Paris School of Economics for helpful comments. We thank John Golden and
David Schwartz for their help in clarifying points regarding the legal doctrine and procedure governing
patent invalidation suits. Joanne Evangelista provided excellent research assistance.
Abstract
We study the causal impact of patent invalidation on subsequent innovation and exit by patent
holders. The analysis uses patent litigation data from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, and exploits random allocation of judges to control for endogeneity of the decision.
Invalidation causes patent holders to reduce patenting over a five-year window by 50 percent
on average, but the effect is heterogeneous. The impact is large for small and medium-sized
firms, particularly in technology fields where they face many large competitors, and for patents
central to their technology portfolio. We find no significant effect for large firms. Invalidation
also increases permanent exit from patenting by small firms.
Keywords: patents, innovation, small firms, exit, courts
JEL Codes: O31, O32, O34, K41, L24.
1 Introduction
Innovation lies at the heart of high-tech entrepreneurship and economic growth. Modern macro-
economic growth models give a central role to innovation and the competition that generates
incentives for it, including the interaction between small entrants and large incumbents in this
process (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Acemoglu, Akcigit, Bloom and Kerr, 2013). At the same
time, a large body of microeconomic evidence shows that there is underinvestment in R&D,
with social rates of return being more than twice as large as the private rates (Jones and
Williams 1998; Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen, 2013). This is a primary justification
for government support of innovation, and patent rights are one of the key policy instruments
for this purpose. It is important to understand whether patents are actually an effective in-
novation incentive and, importantly, whether they work equally well for small and large firms
and in different competitive environments.
A number of economic and legal scholars have raised serious doubts about whether patent
rights actually promote innovation, and there is a widespread view that current patent policy,
and debates over patent reform, are not based on empirical evidence (Boldrin and Levine,
2013; Burk, 2016). One of the most prominent legal scholars in the area argues that much of
the patent policy discussion is ‘faith-based’, with “participants on both sides of the IP debates
increasingly taking out positions that simply do not depend on evidence at all.” (Lemley, 2015).
In a recent paper, Williams (forthcoming) provides a thoughtful and balanced analysis of the
issues and the evidence on how patent rights affect innovation and welfare, and identifying the
gaps in our empirical knowledge that need to be filled to reach definitive conclusions. As she
puts it, “While patent systems have been quite widely used both historically and internationally,
there is nonetheless a tremendous amount of controversy over whether the patent system is —
in practice — improving the alignment between private returns and social contributions.”
To address this need for more empirical evidence, in this article we analyze how the loss
of patent rights affects a firm’s level of subsequent innovation, and the likelihood that a firm
exits from patenting activity entirely, for small and large firms across a range of technology
fields. To do this, we study the impact of judicial invalidation of existing patents on the owner’s
subsequent patenting activity over a five year window. Our analysis shows that patents have
an impact on future patenting for small and medium-sized firms, but we find no evidence of
significant impact on large firms. We also show how the effectiveness of patent rights depends
on specific features of competition in the technology markets.
1
From a theoretical perspective, the impact of patent invalidation on future innovation
is not obvious. The conventional view is that patents enhance the ability of firms to capture
innovation rent, but at the cost of creating a static efficiency loss from higher prices (Arrow,
1962). We show that more complex interactions arise from two sources when innovation is
cumulative. The first is complementarity between the current and subsequent generation of
innovation: the ability of a firm to innovate in the future and capture the rents from that
innovation will depend on the firm’s current stock of patents. Second, patent invalidation
triggers a potential patent race building on the innovation by opening up the technology to
potential competitors. The model developed in this article highlights the trade-offs involved
and shows that the qualitative effect of patent rights on future patenting is ambiguous, as it
depends on features of the firm and the technological competition they face. Thus empirical
analysis is essential to inform patent policy.
Despite its central importance, there are relatively few studies with causal evidence
on whether patent rights are an effective incentive for innovation, and the existing studies
do not speak with one voice.1 For example, Budish, Roin and Williams (2015) show that
there is more innovation, as measured by clinical trials, on late-stage cancer drugs that have
longer effective patent lives (due to shorter regulatory screening times). Similarly, Farre-Mensa,
Hegde and Ljungqvist (2015) use the quasi-random assignment of patent examiners to study the
impact of patent rights on new start-up firms. They find that a patent grant strongly increases
subsequent patent applications and growth, and also raises the probability of an IPO. On the
other hand, Sampat and Williams (2015) use quasi-random assignment of patent examiners to
study whether human gene patents affect subsequent innovation by the patentee (and others)
and find no significant effect. Even more surprising, Baten, Bianchi and Moser (2015) show
that the imposition of compulsory licensing on chemical patents by German firms after WWI
increased subsequent patenting by the (large) chemical firms that owned them. Our article
develops a model which reconciles these apparently contradictory findings in the literature.
Patent rights can affect innovation, especially for small firms, through several channels.
First, patents shape the nature of competition in product and technology markets, especially
in settings where small firms interact with large incumbents (Spulber, 2013; Aghion, Howitt
1 In a related strand of the literature, there are studies that use patent renewal data and other approaches
to measure the incremental incentives provided by patent rights (Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; Schankerman,
1998; Arora, Ceccagnoli and Cohen, 2008). They show that patents are associated with greater private value
derived from inventions. However, these studies do not provide causal evidence on the link between patent rights
and the level of innovation.
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and Prantl, 2015). While the relationship between patent rights, competition and innovation
is theoretically ambiguous, recent research suggests that patents are particularly effective in
providing incentives when competition is intense (Aghion et. al., 2005). Moreover, patents
are often the key assets that enable small firms to license their innovations to large firms for
commercialisation (Gans, Hsu and Stern, 2002). In this way, patents underpin the mark for
innovation which in turn facilitates efficient vertical specialization in innovation, commercial-
ization and enforcement of knowledge assets (Galasso, Schankeman and Serrano, 2013).
Second, patents facilitate access to debt and venture capital markets for financially con-
strained innovators. This is especially relevant to small (and young) firms for whom information
asymmetry is severe and patents may be their primary collateralizable asset (Hochberg, Serrano
and Ziedonis, 2014). Finally, patents are often used to secure cross-licensing agreements and
as bargaining chips to resolve disputes and gain access to patented inputs needed to conduct
research (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004).
We develop a model that shows how the loss of patent rights affects incentives to innovate.
The basic mechanism is as follows: We assume that a firm builds on its stock of existing patents
in subsequent rounds of innovation, and that there are diminishing returns in this process.
When a patent is invalidated, the firm retains the knowledge embodied in the patent, but the
loss of patent protection allows other firms now to exploit this knowledge without a license. The
resulting innovation race has an ambiguous effect on the patentee’s incentives. The payoff to
future R&D investment declines because the competitive rents are dissipated by the patent race.
At the same time, the patent race intensifies incentives because of strategic complementarity
in R&D — i.e., the firm needs to raise its effort to win the race to commercialize the technology.
The model generates two main predictions. First, the loss of a patent on a core technology
— which serves as the basis for subsequent innovation — affects innovation more for small firms
than for large firms. This follows from our assumption of diminishing returns to patent portfolio
size as an input to cumulative innovation by the firm. Second, for a small firm the impact of
losing a core patent will depend on the number of potential licensees for the technology (in
the empirical work, we associate this with the number of large firms in the related technology
area). The reason is that the patentee is more likely to be able to license the technology and
extract greater value when there are more potential licensees.
The main empirical challenge is the potential endogeneity of court decisions to invalidate
an existing patent. This can arise in a variety of way, but of particular concern in our setting
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is that firms which aggressively patent, filing numerous patent applications some of which are
of dubious validity, are more likely to experience invalidation by the courts. To address this
concern, we adopt (and extend) the identification strategy in Galasso and Schankerman (2015).
We study decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive
jurisdiction in appellate cases involving patents. Each decision is by majority rule of three-
judge panels, which are randomly assigned by a computer algorithm. We exploit this random
allocation of judges, together with variation in their propensity to invalidate, to construct an
instrumental variable for patent invalidation.
It should be noted that patents litigated in the Federal Circuit are typically high value
patents, as they have gone through the costly litigation process up to the appellate level.
For purposes of studying how patents affect innovation incentives, it is reasonable to start by
analyzing Federal Circuit patents because the distribution of patent values is highly skewed
(Schankerman and Pakes, 1986) and the incentives generated by these patents are likely to be
more important for welfare.
The main findings in the article are as follows. First, the loss of patent rights due to
Federal Circuit invalidation causes, on average, a 50 percent decrease in future patenting (in a
five-year window) by the focal patentee. This result is robust to a wide variety of specifications
and controls. Second, the impact of patent rights depends critically on the size of the firm,
the competitive environment and the nature of the technology. The effect is driven by small
innovative firms and by firms losing patents on technologies that are core to their research
focus. Third, we find that the loss of a patent has a much larger impact on small firm inno-
vation in technology fields where they face many large firms. This is consistent with the idea
that patents are especially important in shaping the competition in product and technology
markets, and facilitating the licensing of innovations by small firms to larger incumbents for
commercialisation, as discussed above. Finally, we show that losing a patent right sharply
increases the probability that a small firm exits the market (as indicated by a complete ces-
sation of patenting). This confirms that patent rights affect not only the level of innovation
by ongoing firms, but also the extensive margin of firm survival and thus can be critical for
high-tech entrepreneurship.
The magnitude and the heterogeneity in the effect of patent rights we find are not obvious
a priori. Even in a sample like ours, where patents are valuable as revealed by the substantial
litigation cost, we show that only a subset of invalidation cases have any significant impact
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on future patenting. The findings are consistent with the idea that patents are especially
important in shaping the competition in product and technology markets, and facilitating
the licensing of innovations by small firms to larger incumbents for commercialization. We
think that documenting such heterogeneity is important, and highlights the need of additional
research to inform policy makers.
Finally, we combine the estimated effect of patent rights on the patent holder from this
paper, together with the impact on innovation by other firms from Galasso and Schankerman
(2015), to perform illustrative computations assessing the overall impact of patent invalidation
for the patents in our sample. We conclude that the combined effect of patent rights litigated
at the Federal Circuit was to block subsequent innovation by a modest amount, i.e. if all these
patents were invalidated, follow-on innovation would have been somewhat higher. From a more
law and economics perspective, we also analyze what the overall effect of having the Federal
Circuit Court was, relative to not having any appellate court. We conclude that the impact of
its decisions to reverse the lower courts (both invalidity and validity rulings) was to stimulate
subsequent patenting marginally (by less than two percent).
From a broader innovation perspective, this article shows that the loss of patent rights
(on core technologies) sharply reduces innovation, and increases the likelihood of exit, by small
firms, but not for large firms. This sharp difference between small and large firms is consistent
with recent macroeconomic research showing that R&D subsidies are more effective when tar-
geted at small innovative firms rather than large incumbents (Acemoglu et. al., 2013). Taken
together with our earlier study on cumulative innovation (Galasso and Schankerman, 2015),
this article documents that patent rights have heterogeneous effects on innovation by both the
patentee and other competing firms. This research raises serious questions about whether a
‘one size fits all’ patent system is desirable. While the practical challenges of designing a more
nuanced patent system should not be underestimated, more research on these issues seems
warranted.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model showing how loss of a
patent right can affect innovation incentives for subsequent innovation. Section 3 describes
the data set. Section 4 discusses the econometric specification and identification strategy. In
Section 5 we present the baseline estimates of the effect of patent invalidation on innovation.
In Section 6 we show that the impact of patent rights is heterogeneous, differing sharply for
small and large firms, and core and peripheral patents. Section 7 tests several different mech-
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anisms that might explain the impact on small firms. Section 8 shows that the loss of patent
rights powerfully affects the exit probability for small firms. Section 9 provides a preliminary
assessment of the net effect of patent rights and the impact of the Federal Circuit Court. We
conclude with a brief summary of findings and their policy implications.
2 Analytical framework
We model the innovation process in two stages. In the first stage a firm invests in R&D which
generates a new technology stochastically. In the second stage the firm commercializes the
innovation. The firm is endowed with  patents on ‘core’ technologies and  on ‘peripheral’ ones.
We define core technologies as those that facilitate the development of subsequent innovation.
By contrast, peripheral technologies increase the innovation rent that the firm can capture from
its core technologies, but do not affect the success probability of follow-on innovation.2 Let
 = +  denote the total number of patents held by the firm. We assume that the number of
core patents a firm owns is a fixed proportion of , i.e.  = 3
The probability of developing a new innovation when the firm owns  valid core patents is
given by  () with  () = 1−(1−) and   1. This formulation embodies complementarity
between the existing stock of core technologies,  and current research investment,  and
implies diminishing returns of core knowledge on the marginal product of R&D, which is a
property of most standard production functions.  () can be interpreted as the likelihood of
getting at least one idea, when ideas are independent draws with probability  from each of the
(symmetric) core patents. In the case in which multiple ideas originate from the core patents,
we assume that the firm is restricted to develop only one.4 The cost of R&D is () = 22
A patent on a core technology allows the patentee (‘focal firm’) to block other innovators
2The original distinction between core and peripheral technologies goes back to the sociologist Thompson
(1967), who argued that the role of peripheral technologies is to seal-off core technologies from ‘environmental
influences’. From an economic perspective, this could take the form of diversifying revenue sources that build on
core technologies (entering different product market niches using the same core knowledge) to protect the core
idea from idiosyncratic demand shocks in different applications. The economics and management literatures
emphasise the related concept of core competencies in shaping a firm’s strategies and competitiveness. A recent
empirical study shows that the distinction between core and peripheral patents is important in explaining
knowledge spillovers through job mobility (Song, Almeida and Wu, 2003).
3This assumption simplifies the analysis but is not required. Our results are robust to any strictly increasing
function  = () with  ≤ 
4Our results generalize to the case where the expected number of commercialized technologies increases less
than linearly in . This assumption is consistent with the management literature documenting a tendency for
large firms to exploit only a limited fraction of the ideas generated by their scientists (Cassiman and Ueda, 2006;
Cohen, 2010).
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from building on it. If the patent is invalidated, the focal firm still retains the knowledge about
the technology which it can use in developing the next innovation. However, the loss of the
patent right means that the firm can no longer block other firms from using the knowledge
and thus induces a patent race for the follow-on innovation. The focal firm innovates if it
successfully builds on the remaining valid patents or it wins the patent race building on the
invalidated patent. The probability that the focal firm innovates becomes () with
() = 1− (1− ) − (1− )−1(1− ())
where () captures the probability of winning the patent race for the follow-on technology
which builds on the invalidated patent. The term (1− ) is the probability of not getting an
idea from any of the core patents and (1 − )−1(1 − ()) is the probability of getting an
idea only from the invalidated patent and losing the patent race. We assume that () = 
where the parameter   1 can be interpreted as the level of rivalry in the patent race (Loury,
1979).
Commercialization of the new technology yields a revenue equal to Θ  1 If the firm
has  ≥  patents, it can commercialize the technology itself. Firms with    commercialise
their innovation through licensing. This captures the idea that internal commercialisation is less
profitable for small firms. This can arise in at least two ways. First, small firms are less likely
to have access to the requisite complementary assets. Second, large patent portfolios increase
the value from commercialization by providing a ‘buffer’ to protect products incorporating the
firm’s (core) technologies and enhancing the ability of the firm to enforce patent rights more
effectively (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004).
In the case of external commercialization, the firm can negotiate a licensing deal with
one of  symmetric firms, each of whom needs the technology with probability . The firm
bargains with potential licensees sequentially. If a license is struck, the firm earns Θ The timing
of the licensing game is as follows. The firm approaches one potential licensee and makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer for an exclusive license. If the licensee accepts, the licensing subgame
ends. If the offer is rejected, the patentee moves to the next firm and payoffs are discounted by
We let (Θ)  Θ denote the expected payoff of the innovator from this licensing subgame.
A firm that retains the litigated patent sets its R&D investment to maximize Λ () −
22 where Λ = {(Θ) if   Θ if  ≥ } is the value of commercialising the new
technology. If the patent is invalidated, the firm sets R&D to maximise Λ() − 22. The
optimal level of R&D with  valid patents is ∗ () = Λ () and the optimal level in the case
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of invalidation is
∗ () = Λ 1− (1− )
−1
1− 2Λ (1− )−1 
Defining ∆ = ∗ ()− ∗ () we obtain the impact of patent invalidation on R&D by the firm:
∆ = Λ
µ
1− (1− ) − 1− (1− )
−1
1− 2Λ (1− )−1
¶

The following proposition summarizes the predictions of the model about how patent
invalidation affects innovation by the patent owner.
Proposition 1 There exists: (i) an ∗  0 such that, for   ∗ ∆ =  −   0 and
∆
  0; (ii) an ¯   such that |∆| is larger for firms with    than for firms with   ¯.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The main result of the model is that invalidation has an ambiguous effect on innovation
incentives. Loss of a core patent has two countervailing effects (there is no effect for peripheral
patents, by assumption). The number of ideas which the firm can develop in the absence
of external competitive pressure declines when it loses a patent, and this reduces incentives.
However, invalidation opens up the technology field and induces a patent race. Because the
probability of winning the race increases with the R&D investment, invalidation also has a
positive effect on innovation incentives. Which effect dominates depends on the intensity of
the competition in the patent race, reflected in the parameter 
Part (i) of the Proposition says that when the firm faces intense competition in the
patent race (low ), the first effect dominates, so invalidation reduces follow-on innovation
by the patent holder. When R&D investment by the patent holder substantially affects the
likelihood of winning the patent race (low competition, high ), invalidation increases follow-
on innovation. This highlights that the impact of patent rights depends on the characteristics
of the competitive environment. In addition, for a small firm facing an intense patent race,
the impact of losing a core patent is larger when there are more potential licensees for the
technology (in the empirical work, we associate this with the number of large firms in the
related technology area). The intuition is that more potential licensees make it more likely
that the technology will be licensed (in addition, competition among licensees raises the rent
the innovator can extract, though this element is not in the formal model).5
5While our model takes  as exogenous, one may expect 0()  0 because large firms with a diversified
research portfolio are best positioned to exploit opportunities and flexibility to shift the focus of their research.
This would reinforce our result that the impact of patent invalidation is larger when there are more potential
licensees for the technology.
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Part (ii) says that there is a size threshold, ¯   such that the loss of a core patent
has a greater impact on small firms (  ) than on large firms (  ¯) — and the impact
goes to zero as firm size increases. Because internal commercialization allows large firms to
extract greater profits from their patents, the effect of invalidation is stronger for large firms
than small firms. However, the concavity of  () and () means that the marginal benefit of
owning an extra patent declines as the portfolio size increases. For  large enough, the second
effect dominates and the loss of a core patent affects innovation by small firms more than large
firms.
In Appendix A.2 we show that these predictions hold for a large class of bargaining games,
and in particular do not depend on the take-it-or-leave feature of the licensing negotiation. In
Appendix A.3 we also show that, when competition in the patent race is intense (() is very
small), the comparative statics of the model are robust to a more general specification of the
innovation production process  ( ) ( ) Θ() and (), under some mild conditions on
their curvature.
3 Data
The empirical work is based on an extended version of the data used in Galasso and Schanker-
man (2015), which combines the decisions by the Federal Circuit Court with the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent dataset.
The Federal Circuit, established by the U.S. Congress in 1982, has exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals in cases involving patents (and claims against the federal government in various
subject matter) and consists of twelve judges appointed by the President. Judges are assigned to
patent cases through a computer program that randomly generates three-judge panels, subject
to their availability and the requirement that each judge deals with a representative cross
section of the fields of law within the jurisdiction of the court (Fed. Cir. R. 47.2). Decisions
are taken by majority rule.
We obtain the full text of patent decisions by the Federal Circuit from the LexisNexis
QuickLaw portal. This contains a detailed description of the litigated dispute, the final decision
and jurisprudence used to reach the decision. Using keyword searches, we identify each case
involving issues of patent validity from the establishment of the court in 1982 until December
2010. For each case we record the following information: docket number, date of the decision,
patent identification number, identities of the three judges involved, the plaintiff and the defen-
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dant. The final sample covers 1379 patent invalidity decisions. Information about each patent
in the sample is obtained from the USPTO patent database.
In this article we focus on how patent invalidation affects innovation at the firm level.
To do this, for each owner of patents litigated at the Federal Circuit, we use a number of
data sources to construct the patent portfolio in the year of the Federal Circuit decision and
subsequent patenting activity. The USPTO data provide an assignee identification number, our
main tool to track patenting activity, only for patents granted after 1976. For patents granted
earlier, we retrieve data through manual searches on ‘Google Patents’. Assignee numbers are
not provided for patents owned by individual inventors. For each of these patents, we identify
the disambiguated name of the first inventor, exploiting the data described in Li et. al. (2014).
We then track patenting activity over time by identifying patents with inventors having the
same name, city, country and zip-code of the first inventor of the litigated patent. Finally,
assignee identification numbers are not available for patents classified as ‘unassigned’ by the
USPTO. For these patents, we identity the patentee from the text of the Federal court decision.6
The main variables used in the empirical analysis are described below.
PostPatents: number of patent applications by the patent owner (assignee) in a five
year window after the Federal Circuit decision. This is our primary measure of innovation.
Because of granting delays, we date the patents using the year in which they were applied for.
Invalidity: a dummy variable equal to one if the Federal Circuit invalidates at least one
claim of the litigated patent. This is the main explanatory variable of interest, and represents
the removal of patent rights.
PrePatents: number of patents applied for by the patent owner in the ten years pre-
ceding the Federal Circuit decision.
Technology field: dummy variables for the six technology classes in Hall, Jaffe and
Tratjenberg (2001) — chemicals, computers and communications, pharma, electrical and elec-
tronics, mechanicals, and others. We also employ a narrower definition based on the 36 two-digit
subcategories.
Table 1 provides summary statistics. The Federal Circuit invalidates in 40 percent of
cases. On average the cases involve firms with 336 patents in their portfolio and that apply for
6For each unassigned patent, we identify the names of the parties involved in the suit. If one of the litigants
is also an inventor listed on the patent, we classify the patent as assigned to that individual. If litigants are
firms, we exploit the USPTO re-assignment data to confirm that the patent was assigned to one of the firms and
use the USPTO assignee data to retrieve an assignee number of the acquiring firm. We dropped patents where
we were unable to match the patent to an entity with confidence.
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214 patents in the five years after the decision, but the portfolio distribution is highly skewed
(median is 14, and 21 percent of the firms have only one patent).
Federal Circuit cases represent a selected sample of highly valuable patents. For example,
in January 2005 the Federal Circuit invalidated the patent for the once-a-week version of
Merck’s Fosamax, the leading osteoporosis drug in the market at that time. Galasso and
Schankerman (2015) show that commonly-used indicators of patent value — e.g., the number
of claims and citations per claim — are higher for litigated patents than others, and even
higher for those appealed to the Federal Circuit. However, for the purpose of studying whether
patent rights provide important innovation incentives, it is reasonable to start with privately
valuable patents as they are also likely to be of greatest importance for welfare. In addition,
our identification strategy only applies to this sub-population, since unfortunately judges are
not always randomized in cases at the lower (district court) level.
Unlike Galasso and Schankerman (2015), this article is conducted at the firm-case level
because we are interested in identifying the impact of invalidation on innovation by the firm
that loses its patent right. This requires collapsing the dataset from patent-level observations
to firm-level units of analysis. For about 79 percent of the cases in our sample, firms litigate
only one patent, but the remaining cases involve multiple patents owned by the same firm. For
multi-patent cases, we define the invalidity dummy as equal to one if at least one patent is
invalidated, and allow multiple age and technology field dummies in order to characterize all
the patents in the case.7
4 Econometric specification and identification strategy
The final dataset is a cross section where the unit of observation is a Federal Circuit case
involving firm .8 Our main empirical specification is
( + 1) =   + 0 +  (1)
7 In the sample, 158 cases involve two patents held by the same firm, 47 have three patents, 14 involve four,
and 8 cases have more than five patents. Results are robust to redefining the age of the litigated patents as the
average (integer) age, and the technology field as the modal field of the patents in the case.
8Even though we have some cases of the same firm more than once, we use the subscript  to denote the case
to emphazise that our sample is a cross section.
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where  denotes control variables. We include a dummy control variable for observations
where the firm has zero patenting in the five-year window after the decision.9 The coefficient
 captures the effect of invalidation on subsequent patenting by the firm:   0 means that
firms react to patent invalidation by reducing their subsequent patenting, and thus that patent
rights have a positive impact on innovation. To control for firm heterogeneity that may be
correlated both with the court decision and later patenting, we include the number of patents
received prior to the Federal Circuit decision (PrePatents), and a full set of age, decision
year and technology field dummies. We also include dummies which capture the most extreme
repeat litigants (i.e. firms which appear in 4 or 5 litigation cases in our sample) and an additive
dummy for the largest firms in our sample (top 2 percent of portfolio size). Controlling for these
outliers is important because the patenting strategies of large firms and repeat litigants may
differ substantially from those of other firms in the sample — e.g., the largest firms are likely to
invest more in defensive patenting to resolve disputes (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004), while
the extreme repeat litigants in our sample are likely to have idiosyncratic characteristics.10 We
report robust standard errors clustered at the litigant level.
The main empirical challenge is the potential endogeneity of the Federal Circuit decision
to invalidate a patent. The greatest concern in our context is that firms differ in their propensity
to patent their innovations. Firms that aggressively patent, filing numerous patent applications
some of which are of dubious validity, may be more likely to experience invalidation by the
courts. Conversely, firms that are more selective in patenting are more likely to have their
patents upheld. This would generate positive correlation between  and  in equation
(1) and thus an upward bias in the OLS estimate of . There could also be measurement error in
our measure of invalidation, creating attenuation bias toward zero (though we show robustness
to alternative definitions below).
To address endogeneity, we need an instrument that affects the likelihood of patent
invalidation but does not belong directly in the patenting equation. We exploit the fact that
judges in the Federal Circuit are assigned to patent cases randomly by a computer program.
This ensures that judges with high propensity to invalidate are not assigned to cases because
9 In column 4 of appendix Table A2 we show that the results are robust (and stronger in magnitute) without
this dummy.
10Controlling for these outliers reduces the residual variance of our dependent variable and helps to sharpen
the statistical precision of our estimates. For more details about the repeat litigants and their characteristics
see Appendix A4.
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of unobservable characteristics that are correlated with firm patenting. Randomization of
judges is not sufficient to ensure decisions are random, however, because information that
becomes available to the judges during the litigation process case might be correlated with
future patenting of the firm. The instrument we construct below also takes this concern into
account.
Our instrumental variable, the Judges Invalidity Propensity (JIP) index, is defined for
each case involving firm  as
 = 1 2 3 + 1 2 (1− 3 ) + 1 (1− 2 )3 + (1− 1 )2 3
where 1 , 2  3 are the fractions of votes in favour of invalidity by each of the three judges
assigned to the case calculated for all decisions excluding the case involving firm . In other
words, the decision for the focal firm does not enter into the computation of the instrument for
that decision.11 This feature ensures that any case-specific information that might be correlated
with the decision and future patenting is removed.
Of course, this instrument works only if judges have different propensities to vote for
patent invalidity. Galasso and Schankerman (2015) show that the propensity to invalidate
patents varies widely among judges over the sample period, ranging from a low of 24.4 percent
to a high of 76.2 percent. This is confirmed in the distribution of the JIP index across cases,
which has a mean of 0.35 but varies from 0.16 to 0.54.12
Our estimation procedure instruments the  dummy with the predicted prob-
ability of invalidation obtained from the probit model b =  (). When the endogenous
regressor is a dummy, this estimator is asymptotically efficient in the class of estimators where
instruments are a function of JIP and other covariates (Wooldridge, 2002). Specifically, we
estimate the following two-stage model:
 =  b + 0 +  (2)
( + 1) =  \ + 0 +  (3)
11 In Galasso and Schankerman (2015) we show that, under plausible assumptions on the dispersion of private
information, JIP provides a consistent estimate of the probability of invalidation in a strategic voting model
where the evidentiary threshold is interpreted differently by different judges.
12We use the term ‘bias’ to refer to this variation in the propensity to invalidate, but it can also reflect
differences in their expertise and ability to process information in the different technology fields covered by the
patent cases. Part of the variation in JIP may reflect year effects because ‘biased’ judges may be active only for
a limited period of time. To address this, we regressed JIP against year fixed effects and find that they explain
only about 11 percent of the variation.
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where the set of controls  is the same in both stages.
In Appendix Table A.1 we summarize the relationship between patent invalidation and
judge panels in our data. Probit models confirm a strong positive link between patent invalida-
tion and the JIP index, and this is robust to including a set of controls for patent characteristics.
Moreover, OLS regressions with JIP as dependent variable confirm the randomization of judges
to cases. The portfolio size of the patent owner, the age of the patent and its technology class
are all unrelated to JIP. Only the year effects are significantly correlated with JIP, which arises
mechanically because some of the ‘biased’ judges are active only for a subset of years.13
5 Empirical results
Table 2 examines how Federal Circuit invalidation affects subsequent patenting by the focal
firm. Column 1 presents OLS estimates of the baseline specification relating the number of
patent applications in a five-year window after the court decision to the invalidity dummy and
additional controls. There is no statistically significant correlation between patent invalidation
and future patents. This result is not causal, however, since we might expect unobservable fac-
tors to affect both the invalidity decision and subsequent innovation. This intuition is confirmed
by a Rivers-Vuong test that provides strong evidence against the exogeneity of invalidation.14
In column 2 we instrument the Invalidity dummy with the predicted probability of in-
validation obtained from the firm-level probit regression from column 2 of Table A1 (we report
the first-stage regression for this specification in column 1 of Table A7). The IV estimate of
 — which gives the local average treatment effect of invalidation — is highly significant and
large. Exponentiation of the coefficient implies that patent invalidation causes a reduction in
firm patenting of about 50 percent in the five years following the Federal Circuit decision.15
Interestingly, the size of this effect is very similar to the finding in in Farre-Mensa, Hegde
and Ljungqvist (2015), who study the impact of patent grant on a sample of start-up firms,
13A battery of additional tests confirming the exogeneity of the instrument is presented in Galasso and
Schankerman (2015).
14Following Rivers and Vuong (1998), we regress  on JIP and the other controls in a linear probability
model. We construct the residuals () for this model and then regress subsequent patenting on Invalidity,  and
other controls. The coefficient on  is positive and statistically significant.
15Under U.S. law, the patentee does not generally owe damages or attorney fees to the patent challenger, and
licensees do not recover past royalties if a patent is invalidated (Geffner v. Linear Rotary Bearings, Inc., 124
F.3d 229, Fed. Cir. 1997). Thus, our estimate of the incentive effect is not confounded by additional financial
obligations associated with invalidation.
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exploiting the quasi-random assignment of examiners at the USPTO. We show later that this
local average treatment effect hides important heterogeneity, with the impact of patent rights
strongly depending on characteristics of the patentee and competitive landscape. Before doing
that, we perform a variety of tests to confirm the robustness of our main finding.
First, in the baseline specification the Invalidity dummy is defined as one if any of
the patents litigated in the case is invalidated. In multi-patent cases, this classification may
generate measurement error. We conduct two tests to check whether our estimates are sensitive
to the treatment of invalidity decisions involving multiple patents. In column 3 of Table 2 we
adopt a more restrictive definition of invalidation, where the dummy is one only if all the
patents in a case are invalidated. With this more stringent definition, the fraction of cases in
which invalidation takes place drops from 40 to 36 percent.16 There is essentially no change
in the estimated effect of invalidation. Additionally, in column 4 we drop the cases involving
multiple patents from the sample. Again the coefficient is very similar to the baseline estimate,
confirming that our finding is not sensitive to the treatment of multi-patent cases.
Second our sample contains 240 cases involving repeat litigants. In about 75 percent of
these cases, the spell between the two Federal Circuit decisions is less than 5 years. This is a
concern since the impact of the decision of the court is potentially contaminated by another
decision taking place in the same time frame. To address this concern, in Appendix Table
A2 we present the estimates when we drop cases for which the five year window after the
decisions overlaps with another case for the same patentee. The estimated effect of invalidation
is stronger (though not statistically different) from the one in our baseline. We also re-estimated
dropping all cases with repeat litigants and again the coefficient is very similar to the baseline
estimate.17
There is also a concern that some Federal Circuit decisions may involve rulings that limit
the scope of patentable subject matter rather than simply assessing the validity of the focal
patent. To address this, we identified the most important Federal Circuit decisions that relate
16About 50 percent of cases involving multiple patents result in no patents being invalidated, and 32 percent
result in the invalidation of all patents in the case. Thus the two invalidation measures differ in only about 40
cases.
17We also re-estimated a specification of the baseline model that adds an interaction effect between the
invalidity dummy and a dummy for extreme repeat litigants. The point estimate of the invalidity effect is -
0.529 (standard error of 0.29), which is similar to and not statistically different from the baseline estimate given
in column 2 of Table 2. The estimated coefficient on the interaction variable is very small and statistically
insignificant, -0.053 (standard error 0.71). In short, we find no evidence that the patent invalidation effect is
different for these extreme repeat litigants.
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to patentable subject matter during our sample period. Dropping those decisions (only 3 in
our sample) and re-estimating the model we obtain coefficients that are nearly identical to the
baseline estimates.
Finally, there are 237 cases where we cannot directly retrieve an assignee number from
the USPTO data based on the patents litigated in the case. As described in Section 3, for
these observations we identify the patentee from the disambiguated name of the inventor and
by manual searches on Google patents. In Appendix Table A2 we confirm that our baseline
results are robust to dropping these manually-cleaned observations from the sample.
6 Unbundling the effect of patent rights
The preceding analysis shows that patent rights are an important innovation incentive, on
average. However, the model developed in Section 2 predicts that the impact of patent rights
should depend on characteristics of the patentee (small vs large) and technology (core vs
peripheral patent). In this section we unbundle the average effect of patents and explore
these, and other, dimensions of heterogeneity.
Small vs large firms
We first test the hypothesis that innovation incentives from patent rights are more important
for small patentees than large ones. To do so, we define a ‘large firm’ dummy variable equal to
one for firms in the top quartile of our sample in terms of patent applications in the ten years
prior to the Federal Circuit decision (this threshold corresponds to 108 patents).18 Thus, in
the analysis that follows it is best to think of our ‘small firm’ sub-sample as representing both
small and medium-sized firms.
Table 3 present  regressions that allow for differential impacts of patent rights for
small and large firms. In columns 1 and 2, split sample regressions of the baseline model reveal
a strong negative effect of invalidation on small firms, but no significant effect for large firms.
Column 3 presents a full sample regression that allows the invalidity effect to differ for small
and large firms.19 Again we find no evidence of any effect for large firms — the point estimates
18Over the decade 1991-2001, in the aggregte USPTO data only 0.05 percent of firms are large according to
this definition. If we drop invididuals and unassigned patents, the fraction is about one percent. However, large
firms account for about 50 percent of patenting activity in that period.
19To estimate the regression in column 3, we follow Wooldrige (2000) and exploit a two-stage procedure. In the
first stage Invalidity×Small is regressed on instruments ×Small and ×Large and other controls. Similarly,
Invalidity×Large is regressed on instruments ×Small and ×Large and other controls. In the second stage,
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are small, though with large standard errors. By contrast, loss of a patent causes a large and
statistically significant reduction of 48 percent in future patenting by small firms, and the two
coefficients are statistically different from each other at the 0.05 level.
We did additional regressions that vary the threshold portfolio size to define large firms,
which we report in columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table A3. The results in Table A3 are
robust to these alternative thresholds: the invalidation coefficient for small firms remains large
and highly significant, but there is no evidence of any effect for large firms. In particular,
the difference between the impact for small and large firms holds even if we set the portfolio
threshold for large firms as low as 30 patents. But interestingly, when we raise the threshold to
150 patents, the coefficient of invalidation for small firms remains significant, though somewhat
smaller, and again it is statistically insignificant for large firms. For both thresholds we reject
the hypothesis that the coefficients for small and large firms are the same (p-values=0.03 and
0.01, respectively). These experiments indicate that the importance of patent rights for follow-
on innovation is not limited to very small firms, but also extends over the middle range of firm
sizes.
To this point we define firms size based on the number of patents in its portfolio. We
also checked whether this finding holds if we define firm size in relative, rather than absolute,
terms. To do this, we reclassify firms as small or large on the basis on their patent portfolio
size relative to other patentees in the same (two-digit) technology field. Column 4 in Table 3
presents the parameter estimates using this classification: the results are nearly identical to
the coefficients in column 3.
We also examine a more traditional measure of firm size, the number of employees. To do
this, we use USPTO data which requires firms to report their ‘small entity status’ (less than 500
employees) when they pay patent renewal fees.20 These data are available only for patents filed
on or after December 12, 1980, which are about 70 percent of our sample. Roughly 35 percent
of the matched patentees are classified as small entities and nearly all of them (97 percent) have
a portfolio smaller than 108 patents. However, only 36 percent of large entities have more than
108 patents in their portfolio. Column 3 in Table A3 reports a regression based on the small
the predicted values from these regressions are used to replace the two endogenous variables. Our specifications
include the direct effect of the large dummy along with the interactions with the invalidity dummy.
20 In an attempt to obtain a finer measure of firms’ employment, we matched our data with Bureau Van Dijk
(ORBIS) data. Unfortunately, matching was successful only for a very small fraction of our sample because the
ORBIS data are very sparse for the early part of our sample period.
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entity status which shows that the invalidation effect does not vary with employment size, as
measured here, but its dependence on the size of the firm’s patent portfolio remains robust.
Core vs peripheral patents
The model in Section 2 distinguishes between core and peripheral technologies, building on
ideas in the sociology and management literatures. Core technologies, and the associated
patents and business models, create the sustainable competitive advantage for the firm, with
peripheral technologies/patents typically building on the core to extract greater value and
provide a protective buffer (Thompson, 1967). Our model assumes that future innovation
builds only on core technologies, which implies that only the loss of a core patent would affect
incentives for follow-on innovation by the patentee. The more general point is that we expect
patent rights over a core technology to be more important for subsequent innovation than
peripheral patents.
We investigate this hypothesis by constructing two measures of core patents. The first is
based on whether the litigated patent falls in a technology field that represents the main focus
of the firm’s patenting activity. We identify the (two-digit) technology field of each patent
in our sample and compute the share of the patentee’s portfolio belonging to the ‘focal’ field
where the litigated patent is assigned. On average, the litigated patents in our sample belong
to technology fields which account for roughly 61 percent of the patenting of the firm, but
there is substantial variation in field shares (standard deviation = 0.36). For about 37 percent
of litigated patents, all of the firm’s portfolio is in the same technology field, but for about
12 percent the share is below 10 percent. We define a dummy variable, Core=1 if the firm
litigates a patent that belongs to a technology field accounting for at least 66 percent of the
firm’s patenting (i.e. share above the median). For multi-patent cases, we set Core=1 if the
case involves at least one core patent.
The second measure exploits the pattern of self-citations made by the patentee. We
construct the ratio between the self-citations received by the focal patent before the Federal
Circuit decision and the maximum number of self-citations that the focal patent could have
received before the decision.21 On average, patents in our sample receive 8 percent of the
maximum possible self-citations and about 60 percent of the patents receive no self-citations.
The dummy variable Core is set equal to 1 if the firm litigates a patent with a fraction of
21This is equivalent to the degree centrality of the patent in the network generated by the patents applied for
by the patentee between the grant of the focal patent and the Federal Circuit decision (Jackson, 2008).
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self-cites above the 75th percentile. Also for this measure, in multi-patent cases we set Core=1
if the case involves at least one core patent.
Table 4 presents estimates of the invalidation effect for core and peripheral patents. In
columns 1 and 2 we present the estimates based on these two alternative measures of Core. The
results are striking. In both cases it is only the loss of core patents that causes a reduction in
follow-on innovation. There is no statistically significant effect for the invalidation of peripheral
patents, and we reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same for small and large firms
(p-values= 0.03 and 0.07, respectively).
We conduct several robustness checks. First, we construct the share of patents in the focal
field exploiting a finer classification, the three-digit USPTO classes. Litigated patents belong
to (three digits) technology fields that account for about 54 percent of the firm’s patenting on
average (standard deviation = 0.41). As before, we set Core=1 if the firm litigates a patent in
a field with share above the sample median. The estimated coefficients (unreported) are nearly
identical to those in column 1. Second, in Appendix Table A5, we vary the cut-off share used
to classify a patent as core using the two-digit technology classification. As we increase the
threshold from 0.25 to 0.75 the estimated effects increase monotonically. This indicates that
the loss of a core patent is most damaging to innovation when the firm is highly specialized in
the technology field (as before, losing a non-core patent has no significant impact).
Low vs high value patents
We also examine whether invalidation of more valuable patents has a stronger impact on sub-
sequent patenting. Follow-on innovation incentives may be affected not only by invalidation of
patents on core technologies that future innovation builds on, but also by the loss of revenue,
especially for small, cash-constrained firms that finance innovation with internal funds. To
consider this, we examine whether invalidation of more valuable patents has a stronger impact
on subsequent patenting. We construct a measure of patent importance exploiting the number
of citations received by the patent from other firms (non-self cites) before the Federal Circuit
decision. To take into account that the citation profile of patents varies across technology areas
and depends on the age of the patent (Mehta et al, 2010), we filter the citations with age
dummies and 32 technology subcategory effects.
In column 3 of Table 4 we define a patent as High Value if it has (filtered) citations above
the 75th percentile in our sample. In column 4 we use the 90th percentile as the threshold.
These regressions show that invalidation of more valuable patents has a stronger negative
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impact on future patenting. Invalidation of low-value patents does not have a statistically
significant effect, but the estimates has a large standard error; we can reject that the equality
of the impact for the low and high value patents only at the 10 percent level.
Of course, there is the concern that the High Value dummy may simply capture core
patents. This is not supported by the correlation between Core and High Value, which is only
-0.01; the fraction of core patents is essentially the same within the sets of high and low value
patents. To confirm this, we run an IV regression with separate interactions between invalidity
and the high value dummy, and invalidity and the core patent dummy. The (unreported)
coefficients on both interaction terms are negative and statistically significant. This reinforces
the idea that the two variables capture conceptually distinct characteristics of the patent, and
that Core is not simply a proxy for High Value.
7 Explaining the impact for small firms
The empirical results show that patent rights are critically important for innovation by small
firms. In this Section we investigate three potential explanations for this finding. First, patents
can soften the impact of product market rivalry with large firms and improve the ability of
small firms to license their innovation to large firms for commercialisation (Gans, Hsu and
Stern, 2002; Gans and Stern, 2003). Second, patents may enhance the ability of small firms
to access debt and venture capital finance (Conti, Thursby and Thursby, 2013; Hochberg,
Serrano and Zeidonis, 2014). Finally, patents serve as valuable bargaining chips to get access
to patented inputs needed for research and help resolve disputes through cross-licensing and
other arrangements (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Galasso, 2012). We want to identify
which of these channels are important, not least because they have different policy implications.
Competition with large firms
Patent rights can be crucial for small innovators when they face competition from larger,
established firms in technology (and product) markets. There are three reasons for this. First,
product market rivalry is likely to be more intense when there are many large firms active in the
field. While the relationship between patent rights, competition and innovation is theoretically
ambiguous, recent research indicates that patents are particularly important when competition
is intense (Spulber, 2013; Aghion, Howitt and Prantl, 2015). Second, the presence of multiple
large firms increases the bargaining power of small innovators, and thus the licensing rent they
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can extract from a patented innovation. Third, large firms are likely to be well-positioned to
compete in developing and commercializing innovation that builds on an invalidated patent
(thus undermining the original patent owner in the follow-on patent race). This is so because
large firms have the requisite complementary assets and greater flexibility in directing their
research efforts (Gans and Stern, 2003).
For these reasons, we expect patent invalidation would be more damaging to innovation
incentives for small, high-tech firms that operate in fields with many established large firms. To
test this hypothesis, we need a measure of the potential competitors among large firms in the
technology field of the litigated patent (‘focal field’). We identify all firms that have a portfolio
of at least 75 patents, in the ten-year window preceding the Federal Circuit decision, and at
least 50 percent of their portfolio in the two-digit technology area of the litigated patent. On
this measure, the mean number of large firms active in the focal technology field is 38 (median
= 13). We then define a dummy variable Few Large Firms=1 if the number of large patentees
in the focal field is in the first quartile of the sample (corresponds to 5 large firms).
Column 1 in Table 5 presents the IV estimates of the invalidation effect for small firms
operating in a focal technology field with few versus many large patentees. The results show
that patent invalidation reduces innovation only when small firms are in technology fields where
large firms are more active. The impact is large: invalidation for these small firms reduces their
future patenting by about 67 percent. But invalidation has no statistically significant effect on
innovation for small firms in fields where few large firms are present. In Appendix Table A6
we present additional regressions that vary the thresholds for the number of large firms, their
share of patenting in the focal field, and the fraction of patenting used to classify a large firm
as active in the field. The results in column 1 of Table 5 remain robust.22
We next examine whether the effect of patent invalidation for small firms is concentrated
in a few specific technology fields, or is more pervasive. To do this, we begin by extending
our baseline model (which used a dichotomous breakdown into small and large firms) with a
more flexible specification that allows the impact of invalidation to vary continuously with the
logarithm of the number of large firms in the field (again defined as those with at least 75
22We also examine whether this finding simply reflects instances where there are fewer firms in total — less
competition overall — rather than being something specific about the interaction between small and large firms.
To do this, we construct a measure of the ‘equivalent number of firms’ in a field, defined as the reciprocal of the
Herfindahl concentration index, and include this control variable in the  regressions reported above. These
regressions confirm that the impact of invalidation for small firms is larger when small firms face larger firms in
the focal technology field, controlling for our measure of overall competition in that field.
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patents and 50 percent in the focal, two-digit technology field). The  estimates confirm that
the negative impact of invalidation is larger (in absolute value) for small firms when they face
a greater number of large firms in the technology field. Using these estimates, we compute
the implied impact of patent invalidation on small firm innovation for each of the two-digit
technology fields (36 in total), based on the sample mean number of large firms in each field.
The results (not reported) show that the impact varies somewhat across broad one—
digit technology fields: the largest effect is in Pharmaceuticals, where the estimate (standard
error) is -1.79 (0.74), as compared to a low of -0.34 (0.42) in Electronics. More striking is the
large variation across two-digit areas within any given one-digit field. For example, within
the Pharmaceuticals category, the invalidation effect on small firms varies from -2.98 (1.28) in
Drugs to -0.23 (0.37) in Genetics and Biotechnology. Within Electronics the effect varies from
-1.71 (0.72) in Semiconductor Devices to -0.24 (0.36) in Nuclear and X-rays. This diversity
characterizes all six one-digit technology areas. It reflects the fact that most of the variation
in the number of large firms arises within the six broad fields (only 30 percent of the total
variance is across one-digit fields), and it is not concentrated in few broad technology fields.
The approach above has a limitation: it does not recognize that large firms in different,
but technologically related, fields may also be effective potential competitors. To address this
concern, we build on Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013) who develop a ‘Mahalanobis’
index that measures the technological proximity between different patent classes based on the
frequency with which firms tend to patent in specific subset of fields (patent co-location). We
compute the number of large firms in each two-digit technology field and then weight them
by the Mahalanobis index of proximity between that field and the one in which the litigated
patent falls (Appendix A.5 for details). This provides a more refined measure of the number of
competition from large firms, which may also prove useful in other contexts, such as empirical
models of entry.
We re-define the dummy Few Large Firms=1 if the Mahalanobis index of large patentees
is in the bottom decile of the distribution. The  estimates using this measure, reported in
Table A6, confirm our earlier results: invalidation has a strong and significant effect for small
firms facing potential competition from many large firms.
Access to finance
Small firms face difficulty in financing their innovation due to information asymmetries in
capital markets (Hall and Lerner, 2010). Recent empirical studies show these frictions can be
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mitigated through debt and venture capital secured by patents (Conti, Thursby and Thursby,
2013; Hochberg, Serrano and Ziedonis, 2014; Farre-Mensa, Hegde and Ljungqvist, 2015). If
our finding that patent invalidation causes a decline in innovation by small firms is driven by
this channel, we would expect to observe a larger reduction for small firms that rely on the
(subsequently invalidated) patent to obtain finance.
To test this, we collect information on whether patents in our sample are used to secure
loans. Following Hochberg, Serrano and Ziedonis (2014), we manually examine the assignment
records for each of the patents in our sample from the USPTO and Google-Patent databases
and identify all instances where patents are assigned to banks or other financial institutions
A complete description of the nature of the transactions is not provided in the assignment
data, but often these assignments are flagged as “security interest” or “collateral assignment,”
confirming the financial nature of the transactions. About 15.5 percent of the patents in our
sample are pledged as collateral at least once during their life, but only 6.5 percent of the patents
(96 patents) are pledged as collateral before the Federal Circuit decision. We generate a dummy
variable Collateral=1 if the patent is used as collateral before the Federal Circuit decision,
and re-estimate the baseline model that includes an interaction between the invalidation and
collateral dummy variables. If financial constraints are an important channel through which
loss of patent rights affects innovation, the effect of invalidation should be stronger for the
patents used as collateral.
The results (column 2, Table 5) show that the impact of patent invalidation is about
twice as large for patents pledged as collateral than for patents not pledged.23 While the
difference between the two coefficients is not statistically significant, the coefficients provide
some additional evidence that patent rights are important for small, high-tech companies to
gain access to finance. While our evidence relates to collateral for bank loans, patent rights
are likely to play a similar role for venture capital financing. We also point out that even if the
patent is not used as collateral before the litigation, it is possible that the loss of licensing income
(current and prospective) associated with patent invalidation could reduce later innovation for
firms that are liquidity-constrained. Our earlier results contrasting the effects of invalidation
23We also tested wheher the effect of invalidation on innovation is larger for young firms, since this is where
informational asymmetries are likley to be most severe. We define age of the patent owner as the difference
between the year of the Federal Circuit decision and the application year of the oldest patent in the USPTO data
for the specific assignee. We redo the  regressions for small firms allowing for an interaction between 
and a dummy for small firms, and another interaction with young firms, using two alternative thresholds for
young (5 and 9 years). In both cases, there is no statistically significant difference in the effect of invalidation
between patents of young and old firms.
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of low vs high-value patents is consistent with this interpretation.
Access to patented inputs
The third channel we consider relates to the role of patents as bargaining chips for enforcing
rights and reducing the transaction costs of obtaining external, patented inputs. Patent port-
folios shape the expectation of repeated interaction between patentees, which allows firms to
resolve disputes ‘cooperatively’ without resorting to the courts (Lanjouw and Schankerman,
2004). Moreover, innovators ‘trade’ patent rights through cross-licensing agreements to avoid
costly litigation and preserve their ‘freedom to operate’ in innovation (Galasso, 2012). Losing
a patent may make it more difficult to access external patent rights, especially for firms with
small patents portfolios. If this channel is important, we would expect patent invalidation to
have a more negative effect on small innovators when they operate in technology fields with
fragmented ownership of patent rights — this is where firms need to engage in multiple licensing
negotiations and the risks of hold-up and bargaining failure are more severe (Ziedonis, 2004;
Galasso and Schankerman, 2010).
To test this hypothesis, we construct a concentration measure Conc4, equal to the patent-
ing share of the four largest assignees in the two-digit technology field of the litigated patent
during the five years preceding the Federal Circuit decision (the mean/standard deviation of
Conc4 are 0.08/0.06, respectively). In column 3 we contrast the  estimates of patent invalida-
tion for small firms operating in fragmented fields (Conc4 below the median) and concentrated
fields (Conc4 above the median). The point estimates are very similar, and not statistically
different from each other. We conclude that the impact of invalidation on innovation by small
firms in our sample is not driven by access to external (patented) inputs.
8 Exit from patenting
We have shown that the loss of a patent sharply reduces subsequent innovation by small firms,
and that this is due both to reduced access to capital markets and intensified competition by
large firms. In this section we investigate whether losing patent rights increases the risk that the
firm exits from the technology competition entirely. One of the hallmarks of entrepreneurship is
the well-documented fact that small firms have both high rates of entry and exit (e.g., Dunne
et al, 1989). In high technology markets where the incentives for innovation are key, it is
important to understand the role of patent rights in affecting this process.
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In this Section we examine how patent invalidation affects exit. To do this, we define a
dummy variable for exit equal to one if the focal firm in the litigation does not apply for any
patents in the five-year window after the court decision (for such presumptive exiters, we also
confirmed that they do not apply for patents in any subsequent part of sample period beyond
this window). This measure may overestimate the degree of exit for two reasons. First, the
firm may stop patenting but remain in the product market (though for high-technology firms,
this seems unlikely). Second, for invalidation decisions late in the sample period, censoring
may lead us to ascribe exit when patenting will occur after the end of the sample. One final
concern is that small firms are often acquired and thus wrongly appear as not engaging in any
further innovation activity. But it is not clear whether patent invalidation makes this more or
less likely (the firm would be a less patent-rich target for acquisition, but at the same time less
expensive).
Table 6 presents  estimates of a linear probability model of exit, including controls
for technology field, pre-decision patent portfolio size, and firm age dummies for intervals 0-5,
6-10 and greater than 10 years (age is measured as date of the court decision minus date of the
firm’s first patent application). The results are presented using various (pre-decision) patent
portfolio thresholds for defining ‘small firms’ in order to identify whether the impact of patent
invalidation on exit varies with firm size.24
Column 1 shows that the loss of patent rights has no effect on exit, when we pool small
and large firms. However, this local average treatment effect hides an important difference
between small and large firms. The results in the other columns show that the loss of a patent
sharply increases the exit probability for small firms, and the effect is statistically significant.
Not surprisingly, we see no evidence that invalidation increases exit by large firms. Interest-
ingly, the estimated impact of invalidation on exit for small firms monotonically increases as
we tighten the definition of small firms (moving from columns 2 to 6). For firms with a patent
portfolio less than 30, invalidation raises the exit probability by 0.347, which is about a 53
percent increase relative to the sample mean for this size category.25 For very small firms, with
portfolio of three patents or less, the coefficient corresponds to a 63 percent increase in the
24Given the sample size, we are not able to estimate separate coefficients for multiple size categories at the
same time.
25For these firms the average exit rate is roughly 62 percent, which is broadly consistent with an annual exit
probability of about 10 percent in a five year window. While such survival rate is in line with the estimates
in the literature, our findings cannot be easily contrasted with other studies because our measure of exit only
tracks absence of patenting after the Federal Circuit decision.
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sample mean exit rate for that category.
In summary, the evidence shows that losing a patent sharply both reduces the level
of innovation for continuing, small firms and raises the probability of exit (from patenting
activity).
9 Assessing the impact of patent rights and the Court
In our earlier study, we examined the impact of patent invalidation on follow-on innovation by
other firms, as measured by citations (Galasso and Schankerman, 2015). The main empirical
finding is that invalidation raises subsequent citations by about 50 percent on average, but
the impact is localized. It is predominantly driven by the invalidation of patents owned by
large firms, which increases later innovation by small firms. There was no significant effect of
invalidation for other firm size pairings. By contrast, the current article studies the impact of
patent invalidation on follow-on innovation by the patent owner, and finds that invalidation
reduces subsequent patenting by small firms, but has no significant impact on large firms.
In this section, we combine these findings to assess the overall impact of patent rights on
follow-on innovation for the (selected) sample of patents litigated in the Federal Circuit Court,
and the impact of the Court itself. We perform several counterfactual exercises which weigh up
the negative impact on follow-on innovation from invalidation of small firm patents against the
positive effect from invalidation of patents held by large firms (Appendix A6 provides details).
Impact of patent rights in the Federal Circuit sample
In our first counterfactual we estimate what the effect on later innovation would have
been if the Federal Circuit had invalidated all the patents litigated during the sample period.
This exercise provides a measure of how much the patents rights on those innovations affected
follow-on innovation.
We find that invalidating all Federal Circuit patents would have increased follow-on
innovation. The positive impact from invalidating all the large firm patents in our sample (small
firms are induced to do more patenting) is larger than the negative effect from invalidating all
the small firm patents (reduction by the patent owners). The increase in patenting by small
firms is 80 percent larger than the decline, leading to a net increase in follow-on innovation of
roughly 3,000 patents. To gauge the magnitude, this represents roughly a 30 percent increase
in small firms firm patenting relative to what would happen if the Federal Circuit always
upheld the lower court decisions. If we adjust for quality (lifetime citations) of the follow-on
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patents, the effect remains positive but is much smaller - the increase is 20 percent larger than
the reduction, implying a net increase of about 16,000 citations, which represents a 8 percent
increase over the same benchmark measured in citations.
Impact of the Federal Circuit Court
The second exercise we conduct is to compute the overall effect of Federal Circuit reversal
decisions on follow-on innovation (i.e., all cases where the appellate court reversed the lower
court’s ruling, either upholding or invalidating the patent). This calculation gives an estimate
of the impact of having the Federal Circuit itself — as compared to leaving all lower court
judgements uncontested. We find that, on average, reversal decisions by the Federal Circuit
had essentially no effect on subsequent patenting. The positive and negative effects of its
reversals of lower court decisions approximately compensate each other and lead to a very
small change in the total level of patenting relative to the benchmark above - 0.7 percent
decline in patent counts and 2 percent increase in quality-adjusted patenting (citations).
These computations are only illustrative, and two important caveats should be kept
in mind. First, the invalidation impacts we estimate are local average treatment effects and
thus they apply only to the sub-population of Federal Circuit patents that are induced into
treatment (invalidation) by the instrument. Second, these computations do not take into
account the effects that changes in Federal Circuit decisions may have had on the selection of
patents into litigation and appeal. Different behavior by the Federal Circuit, or not having
the appellate court at all, would presumably change the settlement and litigation strategies of
the parties to the dispute.
Most importantly, these findings do not imply that removal of patent rights would nec-
essarily be beneficial. Invalidation of patents in a regime with patent rights is very different
from a regime without patent rights. First, in the presence of patent rights, R&D is conducted
under the expectation of obtaining rents in the form of product market monopoly profits and
licensing royalties. Without patent protection, firms would use other means of capturing rents
(including secrecy) and if these are less remunerative, the level of innovation (and information
diffusion) would be reduced. Second, patents play an important signalling role in capital mar-
kets, and in particular, enable small firms to attract venture capital investors more effectively.
Third, we would expect the direction of technical change to be different in a regime without
patents. Innovators will have greater incentives to invest in research that is more easily pro-
tected through trade secrets and less susceptible to reverse engineering and copying. These
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considerations would need to be accounted for in a full assessment of the net benefits of patent
rights.
10 Concluding remarks
In this article we estimate the causal effect of patent invalidation on innovation using decisions
of the U.S. Federal Circuit Court. Identification exploits the randomised assignment of judges
panels hearing each case. There are three key empirical findings. First, loss of a patent right
causes the owner to reduce subsequent innovation (patent activity) by about 50 percent, on
average. Second, this effect is driven by small firms that lose patents on technologies that are
core to their innovation focus. The impact is especially strong when small firms operate in
technology areas where large firms are particularly active. Finally, we find that the loss of
patent rights also sharply increases the probability of exit from patenting by small (but not
large) firms.
These findings complement Galasso and Schankerman (2015), who show that patent
invalidation increases innovation by other firms, but the effect is localized in particular tech-
nology fields and is driven by invalidation of patents owned by large patentees that triggers
more follow-on innovation by small firms. Taken together, these two studies show that patent
rights affect innovation by small and large firms very differently. This suggests that limited
reduction in the strength/scope of large firms’ patent rights might be expected to promote
follow-on research by small firms, and unlikely to reduce significantly innovation incentives for
large firms. This conclusion is consistent with recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2013), who show
that fiscal stimulus policies for are more effective when targeted at small firms. While the law
and economics literature has discussed possible instruments to differentiate patent rights across
innovators — e.g., patent filing and renewal fees, the scope for injunctions, and presumption of
validity by courts— there are serious practical challenges in implementing such policies. Our
results suggest that more research on these issues is warranted.
Finally, there is one important caveat to bear in mind. We focus on judicial invalidation
of specific patents, not a reduction in the strength of overall patent rights. It remains to be
shown whether or not our conclusions hold for policies that would affect the strength or scope
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Invalidity 0.40 0.49 0 1
PostPatents 213.9 961.9 0 12,988
PrePatents 335.9 1150.6 1 14,208
PreCites 25.6 56.3 0 893
PreSelfCites 2.3 6.6 0 114
Patent Age 9.8 5.0 1 30
NOTES: Sample of 1379 patents involved in Federal Circuit invalidity decisions for period




Table 2:  Patent Invalidation and Innovation   
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method OLS IV IV IV
Dep Variable log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1)




log(PrePatents)  0.548*** 0.554*** 0.553*** 0.518***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033)
Year Effects YES*** YES** YES*** YES***
Tech. Effects YES YES YES YES











IV Test 52.31 65.71 46.44
Sample full full full
drop multi-
patent cases
Fed. Circuit Cases 1038 1038 1038 811
NOTES: *significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent and *** significant at 1 percent. Robust standard errors
clustered at the litigant level are reported in parentheses. PostPatents= number of patent applications of assignee in 5
year window after Federal Circuit decision. Invalidity=1 if at least one patent in the case is invalidated. All invalidated=1
if all  patents in the case are invalidated. PrePatents = number of patent applications of assignee in 10 year window before 
Federal Circuit decision. Age = age dummies in years from fil ing date of patents at Federal Circuit decision. Year= year of
Federal Circuit Decision. Technology fields= 6 categories defined in Hall et al (2001). IV test is the F-statistics from the
Stock and Yogo (2005) weak ID test. We add 1 to PostPatent to include firms with no patenting. Regressions include a





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV
Dep Variable log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1)
Sample large small full full
Invalidity 0.369 -0.604***
(1.014) (0.198)
Invalidity X Small -0.638*** -0.548**
(0.244) (0.267)
Invalidity X Large 0.801 0.128
(0.748) (0.417)
Fed Circuit Decisions 261 777 1038 1038
IV test 7.55 55.78 25.56 51.36
Equality test: p-value 0.04 0.03




NOTES: * significant at 10 percent ** significant at 5 percent and *** significant at 1 percent. Robust standard
errors clustered at the litigant level are reported in parentheses. All regressions control for log(PrePatents), a
dummy for patentees in the top2 percent of portfolio size, dummies for repeat litigants, age, technology and
year effects. In columns 1-3: Large=1 if portfolio in 10 year window >108 patents. In column 4 Large=1 if
portfolio is above 95th percentile of assignees with at least one patent in tech field. IV test is the F-statistics
from the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak ID test. The p-value of the difference is obtained from testing equality
between InvalidityXSmall and InvalidityXLarge. Columns 3 and 4 include direct effect for the dummy Large.





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV
Dep Variable log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1)
Invalidity X Core -0.977*** -1.019***
(0.309) (0.372)
Invalidity X NoCore -0.162 -0.356
(0.436) (0.354)
Invalidity X High-Value -1.277** -1.600**
(0.595) (0.764)
Invalidity X Low-Value -0.226 -0.373
(0.314) (0.315)
Fed Circuit Decisions 1038 1038 1038 1038
IV test 30.84 30.63 28.71 32.61
Equality test: p-value 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.08




High value if cites 
above 75th 
percentile
High value if cites 
above 90th 
percentile
Table 4: Invalidation of Core and High-Value Patents 
NOTES: * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses clustered at the litigant level. All regressions control for log(PrePatents), age,
technology, year effects and dummies for largest patentees and repeat litigants. In column 1 Core=1 if share of
patents in the focal 2-digit technology class is above the median. In column 2 Core=1 if the ratio between the self-
citations received and maximum possible number of self-citations that the focal patent could receive is in top
quarti le. In column 3 High Value=1 if fi ltered citations received before the decision is above the 75th percentile.
In column 4 High Value=1 if filtered citations received before the decision is above the 90th percentile. Columns 1 




Estimation Method IV IV IV
Dep Variable log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1)
Invalidity X Many Large Firms -0.939***
(0.287)
Invalidity X Few Large Firms -0.246
(0.224)
Invalidity X Collateral -1.175**
(0.546)
Invalidity X NoCollateral -0.551***
(0.198)
Invalidity X Fragmented Field  -0.649***
(0.238)
Invalidity X Concentrated Field -0.593**
(0.262)
Fed Circuit Decisions 777 777 777
IV test 20.18 35.85 27.99
Equality test: p-value 0.02 0.25 0.84
Sample Small Firms Small Firms Small Firms
Table 5: Testing Alternative Mechanisms
NOTES: * s igni ficant at 10 percent, ** s igni ficant at 5 percent and *** s igni ficant at 1 percent.
Robust s tandard errors clus tered at the l i tigant level are reported in parenthes es . Al l
regress ions control for log(PrePatents), age, technology and year effects . Col latera l=1 i f patent
is transferred to a bank for securi ty interest. Fragmented field= C4 index of patentees below
sample median. Many large fi rms=1 i f more than 5 large patentees in the field with at least










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV IV IV
Dep Variable Exit Exit Exit Exit Exit Exit
Invalidity 0.204
(0.142)
Invalidity X Small 0.266**  0.277** 0.347** 0.435*** 0.514**
(0.129) (0.137) (0.146) (0.166) (0.222)
Invalidity X Large -0.056 -0.012 -0.033 0.058 0.103
(0.148) (0.134) (0.142) (0.133) (0.125)
Fed Circuit Decisions 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
IV test 53.63 24.99 26.80 26.34 25.04 14.89
Equality test: p-value 0.01 0.02 <0.01 0.01 0.03
Cut-off for large firms 108 pats 50 pats 30 pats 5 pats 3 pats 
Table 6: Invalidation and Exit from Patenting
NOTES: * s igni fi cant at 10 percent, ** s igni fi cant at 5 percent and *** signi fi cant at 1 percent. Robust standard errors clus tered at
the l itigant level are reported in parenthes es . Al l regres s ions control for log(PrePatents ), age of patent, technology effects , year
effects , dummies for la rges t fi rms , dummies for repeat l i tigants , dummies for fi rms with age 0-5, 6-10 and a dummy for individual
inventors . The dependent variable is equal to one if there is no patenting activi ty by the patentee after the Federa l Ci rcui t
decis ion. Columns 2-6 include di rect the effect for the dummy Large.
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A.1. Analysis of the model
First, we need to obtain the expression for L(N,Θ). If there is only one large firm, the expected
payoff of the small firm in the licensing subgame is L(1,Θ) = Θz. With two firms the payoff is








Note that L′(N) > 0. The impact of invalidation is
∆r = Λ

1− (1− α)c −
1− (1− α)c−1
1− 2Λχα (1− α)c−1

(1)
which is decreasing in c (and n given our assumption that c = λn). Thus for small firms |∆r|
is minimized when c is set at the upper bound of the size range for small firms, namely c = λκ.
The corresponding value is
L(N)

1− (1− α)λκ −
1− (1− α)λκ−1
1− 2L(N)χα (1− α)λκ−1

.
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1− (1− α)nL −
1− (1− α)λnL−1
1− 2Θχα (1− α)λnL−1
 .
Because Θ > L(N) and the right hand side of the inequality is monotonic in nL and tends to
zero as nL →∞, there exists an n¯ > κ for which the left hand side is equal to the right hand
side. This proves the first part of the proposition.
Notice that (1) can be positive or negative.1 Moreover (1) decreases in χ and ∆r =
Λα(1 − α)c−1 > 0 when χ = 0. This implies that, for all parameter values, there exists an χ′
such that ∆r > 0 if χ < χ′. The derivative of (1) respect to N is equal to
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1− 2L(N)χα (1− α)c−1

2 .
The first term is positive when χ < χ′. The second term is negative and goes to zero as χ→ 0.
This implies that there is an χ∗ ≤ χ′ for which
d∆r
dN
> 0 if χ < χ∗.
A.2. Generalized bargaining framework
Our model assumed take-it-or-leave-it offers for exclusive licensing deals. We now show robust-
ness to more general bargaining models. Consider a setting in which the patentee approaches
one of the firms. If the firm needs the technology, there is Nash bargaining between the firm
and the licensee with weights β and 1 − β, respectively. If the firm does not need the tech-
nology, the patentee moves to the next firm and payoffs are discounted by δ. We solve the





x1−β which gives L(1,Θ) = zΘ(1− β). When two firms re-
main, the patentee negotiates with the first firm with an outside option of δL(1,Θ). This gives
L(2 ,Θ) = L(1,Θ) [1 +∆δ] where ∆ = (1− z) + βz. Solving the problem recursively we obtain




Equation (2) provides a substantial generalization of our baseline game. When β = 0 the model
collapses to our baseline model in which the patentee has full bargaining power. As β increases
the patentee has greater negotiating power. When β = 1/2 the solution is equivalent to the
equilibrium payoff of the Rubinstein’s alternating offer game with no discounting, as shown in
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). More importantly, note that L′(N) > 0 as long as
β < 1. In other words, our comparative statics hold in more general bargaining environments
as long as the bargaining power of the patentee is not zero.2
2This is consistent with the results in Segal and Whinston (2003) showing that in common agency models the
payoff of the principal increases with the number of agents N in a wide class of games. They show robustness
of this result to settings in which agent’s utility depends on the principal’s unobservable contracts with other
agents.
2
A.3. Generalized innovation production
We now generalize the functional form for the probability of successful innovation and show
that, under mild conditions, the comparative statics results still hold. We assume that V (c, r)
is a continuous function satisfying Vc > 0, Vr > 0, Vrr < 0, Vrc > 0 and limc→∞ Vrc = 0. These
properties are satisfied by most standard production functions with decreasing returns. We
also generalize R&D costs to any continuous function, C(r) with Cr > 0 and Crr > 0.
If the firm commercializes the technology itself, it obtains revenue given by the increasing
and concave function Θ(n).Alternatively, the firm can negotiate a licensing deal with one of
N symmetric firms, each of whom needs the technology with probability z. The firm bargains
with potential licensees sequentially. If a license is struck, the firm earns Θ. We assume that
Θ(1) < L(N,Θ) and L(N,Θ) < limn→∞Θ(n). Under these assumptions, there is a portfolio
threshold size κ — defined by Θ(κ) = L(N,Θ) — where firms with n < κ (‘small firms’) choose
to commercialise their innovation through licensing and firms with n ≥ κ develop it internally.
Unlike in the baseline model in the text, we now assume that χ(r) ≃ 0, which implies that
I(c, r) = V (c − 1, r). That is, competition in the patent race fully dissipates the value of the
(now publicly available) knowledge.
Then the firm chooses its R&D to maximise
L(N,Θ)V (c, r)−C(r) if n < κ
Θ(n)V (c, r)−C(r) if n ≥ κ
where κ is defined as the portfolio threshold for which Θ(κ) = L(N,Θ). In this setting the
























which implies that the effect of invalidation is stronger where there are more potential licensees
in the technology field and where the value of licensing is larger. By assumption (that only
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core patents facilitate subsequent innovation), there is no effect from losing a peripheral patent













These derivatives go to zero as n→∞ and c→∞ because Θn and Fcr are decreasing functions.
A.4. Accounting for repeat litigant outliers
We checked the identity of the eight extreme repeat litigants in our sample (those involved
in four or five Federal Circuit cases). Two of them are prominent universities, five are large
bio-pharmaceutical companies and one is a leading agro-chemical firm. Notably, none of the
repeat litigants are patent assertion entities in our sample. Including the two dummy variables
for extreme repeat litigants reduces the residual variance of our dependent variable and helps
sharpen the statistical precision of our estimates of the effect of invalidation for small and large
firms, and the difference between them. This is because, conditional on other observable factors,
firms involved in multiple litigations may be firms experiencing unusual growth in patenting,
with the largest patenting outliers more likely to be involved in many cases.
The estimated coefficients for these dummies are reported in column 1 of Appendix Table
A4. As expected, there is a large and positive effect for four-time litigants but, surprisingly, an
insignificant effect for five-time litigants. A closer inspection of the data (and the coefficients
on the individual firm dummies for each of the extreme repeat litigants) shows that this coun-
terintuitive, non-monotonic pattern is driven by two of the five-times litigants: Monsanto and
the Beecham Group. In column 2 of Table A4, we drop from our sample the cases involv-
ing Beecham and Monsanto and find that the repeat litigant dummies display the expected
monotonic behavior. Column 3 confirms that this result also holds when we include these
observations but add dummies for these two firms.
In short, the anomalies are Monsanto and Beecham. To understand why, we examined
the recent history of these companies and found that major restructuring events, which happen
to have occurred about the same time as their Federal Circuit cases, largely explains the large
drops in patenting for these two outliers, as we now explain.
The Federal Circuit decisions on the five cases involving the Beecham Group all occurred
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in the period 2002-2006. It turns out that the Beecham Group merged with GlaxoSmithKline
in 2000 (Moore et. al., 2000), and patenting after 2000 only captures the innovations of
a relatively small spin-out GSK subsidiary operating in England (which alone inherited the
Beecham name). As a consequence, none of the post-merger patents in the U.S. by the original
Beecham Company are captured after 2000 and this accounts for the sharp decline in measured
patents for this company and thus the large negative coefficient on the dummy in column 3.
Similarly, the Federal Circuit decision in the cases involving Monsanto all occurred in
the period 2001-2007. Monsanto had three main lines of business: chemicals, agriculture, and
biotechnology-pharmaceuticals. We discovered from the company history that Monsanto spun
off its chemicals business in 1997 and then merged with Pharmacia-Upjohn in 1999, and was
renamed Pharmacia Corporation (Deogun et. al., 1999). The agricultural business was spun
off and became the Monsanto Ag Company, later renamed just Monsanto, and was limited
to specific agro-biotech technologies. Thus, in the post-merger period, after the year 2000,
patenting under the name Monsanto only refers to the limited agro-biotech activity of the
spin-out. Again, this explains the large negative coefficient on its dummy variable in column
3.
A.5. Mahalanobis measure of potential competition
The measure of potential competition is specific to each litigated patent. Let i denote the tech-
nology field of the litigated patent. We identify all the N large firms (with > 75 patents) active
in the ten-year window before the Federal Circuit decision and measure their patenting across
the 426 USPTO three-digit technology classes. Let skj denote the share of firm k
′s patenting
that falls in class j. We define the (N, 426) matrix X that contains the normalized patent class
shares across firms, and the (426, 426) matrix W = X ′X. Each element in W , denoted by wij ,
is the uncentered correlation coefficient between the different three-digit technology fields. If
technology fields i and j coincide frequently within a given firm (i.e., there is a lot of patent
co-location), then wij will be close to one; if they never coincide wij is zero.
To compute the number of large firms potentially active in the technology field i of the





The weight for each large firm (potential competitor) depends on its distribution of patents
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across the three-digit technology fields and on how close those fields are to the techology class
of the litigated patent. A firm with all its patents in the same three-digit class of the litigated
patent receives a weight of one. Firms with a large amount of patents in classes that tend to
overlap frequently with the class of the litigated patent receive a weight close to one, those
patenting heavily in more distant classes receive a weight of zero.






A.6. Assessing the impact of patent rights and the Court
Patents owned by large firms (which are upheld) receive on average 4.4 citations by small firms
in the five-year window after the Federal Circuit decision. In our earlier study, we found that
invalidation increases citations to the focal patent by small firms by 520 percent in the five-
year window, but that about 20 percent of this effect comes from the downstream innovators
substituting from other patents to the focal (invalidated) patent. That is, 80 percent of the
overall citation effect reflects an increase in follow-on innovation (and thus patents) by small
firms. Thus, in our sample, invalidation of a large firm patent generates, on average, about 18
new patents by small firms (4.4× 5.2× 0.8 = 18.3). In Section 6, we estimate that invalidation
of a small firm patent causes a 47 percent reduction in follow-on patenting by the patentee. In
our sample, small firms that do not experience invalidation file 8 patents in the five years after
invalidation, on average. This implies that invalidation of a patent owned by a small firms
reduces subsequent innovation by the patent holder by roughly 4 patents (8× 0.47 = 3.8).
Impact of patent rights in the Federal Circuit sample There are 986 small firm patents
in our sample and 393 large firm patents. Thus, invalidation of all the Federal Circuit patents
would generate 7,074 new patents (393× 18) and at the same time prevent 3,944 new patents
(986 × 4). This implies an overall increase in cumulative innovation (3,130), with a positive
effect 80 percent larger than the negative effect.
To adjust for patent quality we look at the lifetime citations received: (i) by the patents
of small firms that build on Federal Circuit patents of large firms and (ii) by patents of small
firms litigating at the Federal Circuit. On average, patents of small firms that are upheld by
the Federal Circuit receive 21.2 citations. If we look instead at the citations received by patents
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of small firms which cite Federal Circuit patents owned by large firms in our sample, we find
that they receive 14.4 citations on average. This suggest that, on average, the value of the
patent induced by Federal Circuit invalidation is lower than the value of the patent prevented
by Federal Circuit invalidation.
Adjusting for patent quality, we still find a positive effect but of smaller magnitude.
Invalidation of large firms generates 99,036 citation-weighted patents (7, 074×14) and prevents
82,824 citation-weighted patents (3, 944× 21). Thus the increase is 19 percent larger than the
corresponding decrease and quality adjusted patents go up by 16,212 cites.
The benchmark level of patenting is obtained by looking at the entire set of patents
validated and invalidated by district courts, and computing the total amount of follow-on inno-
vation by small firms if decisions were not reversed. This is done assuming that an invalidated
patent of a large firm generates 22 follow-on small firms patents, a validated patent of a large
firms generates 4 patents, a validated small firm patent generates 8 and a small firm invalidated
patent generates 4. Multiplying these number with the number of decisions of each type we
find that in the absence of Federal Circuit reversals, we would observe 10,588 follow-on patents
and 192,192 follow-on cites.
Notice that the patenting effect (3,130) is 29 percent of the follow-on patents in the
absence of Federal Circuit (10,588) and the quality adjusted effect (16,212) is 8.4 percent of
the benchmark level of 192,192 cites.
Impact of Federal Circuit court In our sample, the Federal Circuit reversed about 27
percent of the lower court decisions. Reversal is more common for invalidity decisions (about
38 percent) than for validity decisions (about 13 percent). The reversal rate appear similar for
large and small firms (about 27 percent).
Our data shows that, compared to district court decisions, Federal Circuit reversals
lead to 42 fewer large firm patents invalidated and 171 fewer small firms patent invalidated.
Multiplying these figures by the effect of invalidation of small and large firm patents in our
sample, we find that Federal Circuit decisions reduced follow-on innovation by 72 patents
(171×4−42×18). Once we adjust for patent quality, the conclusion is slightly different. Federal
Circuit reversals increased follow-on innovation by 3,780 citation-weighted patents (171× 4×
21− 42× 18× 14).
Compared to the benchmark level, the overall effect of Federal Circuit reversals is quite
small: -72 patents is equivalent to a 0.7 percent decline and +3,780 citation-weighted patents
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is equivalent to a 1.96 percent increase.
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1 2 3 4
Estimation Method Probit Probit OLS OLS
Dependent Variable Invalidated Invalidated JIP JIP
                              
Judges Invalidity 
Propensity (JIP) 2.748*** 2.207***
(0.708) (0.832)
log(PrePatents) 0.008 -0.001 -0.001
(0.017) (0.001) (0.001)
Year Effects NO YES*** NO YES***
Age Effects NO YES NO YES
Tech. Effects NO YES NO YES
Fed. Circuit Cases 1038 1038 1038 1038
Table A1:   Composition of Judge Panels and Patent Invalidation 
NOTES: * s igni ficant at 10 percent, ** s igni ficant at 5 percent and *** s igni ficant at 1 percent. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses . Inva l idated=1 i f at least one patent in the case is
inva l idated. PrePatents = number of patent appl ications of ass ignee in 10 year window before Federa l
Ci rcui t decis ion. Age = age dummies in years from fi l ing date of patents at Federa l Ci rcui t decis ion. Year=












Table A2:  Robustness of Baseline Regressions - IV Estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4)








Invalidity -0.672** -0.629** -0.645* -1.895***
(0.309) (0.291) (0.344) (0.426)














IV test 57.05 56.57 57.28 67.43
Fed. Circuit Cases 848 798 801 1038
NOTES: * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent and *** significant at 1 percent. Robust standard errors
clustered at the litigant level are reported in parentheses. PostPatents= number of patent applications of assignee in 5 year
window after Federal Circuit decision. Invalidated=1 if at least one patent in the case is invalidated. All regressions control







Table A3:  Impact of Patent Invalidation by Firm Size- Robustness 
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation Method IV IV IV
Dep Variable log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1)
Invalidity X Small -0.664*** -0.848*** -0.816
(0.252) (0.273) (0.535)
Invalidity X Large 1.221 0.164  -0.647*
(0.808) (0.519) (0.349)
Fed Circuit Decisions 1038 1038 768
IV test 24.77 32.93 13.66
Equality test: p-value 0.01 0.03 0.72




NOTES: * significant at 10 percent ** significant at 5 percent and *** significant
at 1 percent.  Robust standard errors clustered at the l itigant level are reported in 
parentheses. All regressions control for log(PrePatents), a dummy for patentees
in the top2 percent of portfolio size, dummies for repeat litigants, age, technology
and year effects. IV test is the F-statistics from the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak ID
test. The p-value of the difference is obtained from testing equality between
InvalidityXSmall and InvalidityXLarge. Regressions include the direct effect for
the dummy Large.
 (1) (2) (3)
Estimation Method IV IV IV
Dep Variable log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1)
Invalidity X Small -0.638*** -0.498** -0.517**
(0.244) (0.239) (0.237)
Invalidity X Large 0.801 0.876 0.754
(0.748) (0.740) (0.690)
Repeat litigant (4 cases) 1.044** 0.843** 0.867**
(0.515) (0.385) (0.379)






IV test 25.56 25.66 30.132
Equality test: p-value 0.04 0.04 0.05





NOTES: * significant at 10 percent ** significant at 5 percent and *** significant at 1 percent.
Robust standard errors clustered at the litigant level are reported in parentheses. All regressions
control for log(PrePatents), a dummy for patentees in the top2 percent of portfolio size, age,
technology and year effects. IV test is the F-statistics from the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak ID test.
The p-value of the difference is obtained from testing equality between InvalidityXSmall and
InvalidityXLarge. Regressions include the direct effect for the dummy Large.












(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV
Dep Variable log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1)
Invalidity X Core -0.631** -0.918*** -0.977*** -0.978***
(0.300) (0.292) (0.309) (0.319)
Invalidity X NoCore -0.321 -0.016 -0.162 -0.156
(0.721) (0.515) (0.436) (0.404)
Fed Circuit Decisions 1038 1038 1038 1038
IV test 21.08 27.43 30.84 32.07
Equality test: p-value 0.64 0.05 0.03 0.02
Core  share 0.25 0.50 0.66 0.75
Table A5: Core Technologies - Robustness 
NOTES: * s igni ficant at 10 percent, ** s igni ficant at 5 percent and *** s igni ficant at 1 percent. Robust standard
errors clustered at the l i tigant level are reported in parentheses . Al l regress ions control for log(PrePatents ),
age, technology effects , year effects and dummies for largest fi rms and repeat l i tigants . Core=1 i f share of
patents  in the foca l  2-digi t technology class  i s  above the speci fic cut-off.  Regress ions  include the di rect control  










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV
Dep Variable log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1) log(PostPat+1)
Invalidity X Many Large Firms -0.861*** -0.708***  -0.759*** -0.598***
(0.264) (0.211) (0.219) (0.177)
Invalidity X Few Large Firms -0.339 -0.142 -0.154 -0.019
(0.226) (0.303) (0.305) (0.793)
Fed Circuit Decisions 777 777 777 777
Sample small firms small firms small firms small firms
IV test 21.94 33.96 30.23 24.55
Many Large Firms if >8 large firms >6 large firms >6 large firms >23 large firms 










Table A6: Large Firm Competition in the Technology Field- Robustness 
NOTES: * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent and *** significant at 1 percent.  Robust 
standard errors clustered at the l itigant level are reported in parentheses. All  regressions control for 
log(PrePatents), age, technology effects, year effects and the direct effect of Many Large Firms. 
  
 
Table A7: First Stage Regressions  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)


































NOTES: * s igni ficant at 10 percent, ** s igni ficant at 5 percent and *** s igni ficant at 1 percent.  Robust s tandard errors  clustered at the fi rm level  
are reported in parentheses .  Large i f portfol io > 108 patents . Core=1 i f share of patents  in the foca l  2-digi t technology class  i s  above the median. 
High Value=1 i f fi l tered ci tations  received before the decis ion i s  above the 75th percenti le. Regress ions  include the di rect effects  for the 





𝑃� X No Core
𝑃� X High Value
𝑃� X Low Value
𝑃� X Large 
𝑃� X Small
